Diplomacy, diplomacy, diplomacy

From Zbigniew Brzezinski

Why we whould not attack Iran:

But there are four compelling reasons against a preventive air attack on
Iranian nuclear facilities:

1. In the absence of an imminent threat (with the Iranians at least several
years away from having a nuclear arsenal), the attack would be a unilateral
act of war.If undertaken without formal Congressional declaration, it would
be unconstitutional and merit the impeachment of the President. Similarly,
if undertaken without the sanction of the UN Security Council either alone
by the United States or in complicity with Israel, it would stamp the
perpetrator(s) as an international outlaw(s).

2. Likely Iranian reactions would significantly compound ongoing U.S.
difficulties in Iraq and in Afghanistan, perhaps precipitate new violence by
Hezbollah in Lebanon, and in all probability cause the United States to
becomebogged down in regional violence for a decade or more to come. Iran
is a country of some 70 million people and a conflict with it would make the
misadventure in Iraq look trivial.

3. Oil prices would climb steeply, especially if the Iranians cut their
production and seek to disrupt the flow of oil from the nearby Saudi oil
fields. The world economy would be severely impacted, with America blamed
for it. Note that oil prices have already shot above $70 per barrel, in part
because of fears of a U.S./Iran clash.

4. America would become an even more likely target of terrorism, with much
of the world concluding that America's support for Israel is itself a major
cause of the rise in terrorism. America would become more isolated and thus
more vulnerable while prospects for an eventual regional accommodation
between Israel and its neighbors would be ever more remote.

And what we should do instead:

The United States should become a direct participant in the negotiations,
joining the three European negotiating states, as well as perhaps Russia and
China (both veto-casting UN Security Council members), in direct negotiations
with Iran, on the model of the concurrent multilateral talks with North Korea;As
in the case of North Korea, the United States should also simultaneously engage
in bilateral talks with Iran regarding mutually contentious security and
financial issues;

The United States should be a signatory party to any quid-pro-quo
arrangements in the event of a satisfactory resolution of the Iranian nuclear
program and of regional security issues.At some point in the future, the above
could perhaps lead to a regional agreement for a nuclear weapons-free zone in
the Middle East, especially after the conclusion of an Israeli-Palestinian peace
agreement, endorsed also by all the Arab states of the region. At this stage,
however, it would be premature to inject that complicated issue into the
negotiating process with Iran.

The choice is either to be stampeded into a reckless adventure profoundly
damaging to long-term U.S. national interests or to become serious about giving
negotiations with Iran a genuine chance to be productive. The mullahs were on
the skids several years ago but were given a new burst of life by the
intensifying confrontation with the United States.

The U.S. strategic goal, pursued by real negotiations and not by posturing,
should be to separate Iranian nationalism from religious fundamentalism.
Treating Iran with respect and within a historical perspective would help to
advance that objective.